Strive Masiyiwa Just Took Econet Private. OK Zimbabwe Just Collapsed. And the ZSE Just Had Its Best Quarter in Years. Welcome to the Split-Screen Economy.
Three things happened in Zimbabwe’s capital markets in the same fortnight. Together they tell you more about the real state of the economy than any GDP figure or inflation print ever will.
Econet Wireless Zimbabwe, the most widely held stock on the Zimbabwe Stock Exchange, voted 95 percent in favour of delisting. Exit offer: fifty cents a share. OK Zimbabwe, one of the country’s most recognisable retail brands, entered voluntary corporate rescue. And the VFEX, the dollar-denominated exchange, delivered a 34 percent return year to date, more than double its full-year performance in 2024.
A billionaire is leaving the public market. A household retailer is dying. And the exchange where the rich trade in dollars is soaring.
That is not a contradiction. It is a diagnosis.
The Masiyiwa Signal
Strive Masiyiwa built Econet into the most emotionally significant company in Zimbabwean corporate history. For millions of shareholders, many of them small retail investors who bought during the indigenisation era, Econet stock was their first and only exposure to equity markets. Owning Econet meant owning a piece of Zimbabwe’s most successful entrepreneur.
Now he is taking it back.
The exit offer is structured as 17 cents in cash plus 33 cents in Econet InfraCo shares, a new infrastructure-focused entity that will not trade on the ZSE. The 95 percent vote in favour tells you the institutional shareholders did the math and concluded that holding a minority position in a Zimbabwe-listed telecoms company with shrinking margins and regulatory uncertainty was worth less than the exit package, however imperfect.
But the signal is larger than the price. Masiyiwa is the most sophisticated business operator Zimbabwe has produced. He understands capital markets, regulatory environments, and long-term value creation better than anyone in the country. When a man of that calibre looks at the Zimbabwean public equity market and decides the correct move is to leave it, every other listed company board should be asking what he sees that they do not.
What he likely sees is this. The ZSE’s liquidity is thin and getting thinner. The 35 percent policy rate makes it cheaper to hold treasury bills than equities. The managed exchange rate compresses the dollar value of ZiG-denominated earnings. Regulatory unpredictability, from retrospective tax changes to retention requirements, makes forward planning unreliable. For a company with Econet’s pan-African footprint and access to international capital, the Zimbabwean listing was a constraint, not an asset.
His departure removes approximately 30 percent of the ZSE’s total trading volume. For every remaining listed company, that means less liquidity, wider spreads, and more difficulty attracting institutional capital. The ZSE after Econet is a smaller, quieter, less relevant market. That is the inheritance of the delisting.
The OK Zimbabwe Collapse
If Masiyiwa’s exit tells you about the top of the economy, OK Zimbabwe’s corporate rescue tells you about the middle.
OK Zimbabwe operated over 60 stores across the country. It employed thousands. Its supply chain touched hundreds of local manufacturers, farmers, and distributors. For most Zimbabweans, OK was where you bought your groceries. It was as embedded in daily life as ZESA or TelOne.
Voluntary corporate rescue means the company cannot meet its obligations. The board concluded that continuing to trade in its current form would result in outcomes worse than restructuring under legal protection. In practice, suppliers will not be paid in full. Employees face retrenchment. Landlords across the country are staring at anchor-tenant vacancies in shopping centres that were designed around OK’s foot traffic.
The cause is not mysterious. Consumer-facing businesses in Zimbabwe are being crushed between two forces. The 35 percent interest rate, which stabilises the ZiG but destroys domestic credit, makes it impossible to borrow for working capital at viable margins. And the real purchasing power of most Zimbabwean consumers has not kept pace with headline economic growth. GDP can expand at 5 or 6 percent while the bottom 70 percent of the population gets poorer if the growth is concentrated in mining, which employs few people relative to its output, and financial services, which serves the wealthy.
OK Zimbabwe is the canary. Dozens of smaller retailers, manufacturers, and service businesses are in the same distress without the name recognition to make the news. The economy that produces a 3.8 percent inflation print and a collapsing retail sector simultaneously is an economy where the averages are lying about the distribution.
The VFEX Paradox
While Econet exits and OK collapses, the Victoria Falls Stock Exchange is having the best stretch in its brief existence. A 34 percent year-to-date return. The ZSE All Share Index is up nearly 29 percent. Zimplats reported a profit increase of over 3,300 percent. African Sun launched a delisting at a 35 percent premium.
The explanation is straightforward once you see the architecture. The VFEX is denominated in US dollars. Its listed companies are predominantly mining houses, commodity exporters, and firms with hard-currency revenue streams. They earn in dollars. They report in dollars. They distribute in dollars. The 35 percent rate that kills domestic retailers is irrelevant to a platinum miner selling into international markets.
The RBZ’s banking fee reforms effective April 1, scrapping account service charges, capping POS fees at 1.5 percent, eliminating minimum transaction charges, will push more ZiG liquidity into the formal banking system and theoretically support ZSE volumes. But the structural advantage of the VFEX, access to hard currency and insulation from ZiG policy, will continue to widen the gap between the two exchanges.
The investors making money in Zimbabwe right now are those with dollar-denominated assets, mining exposure, and the sophistication to navigate a dual-currency capital market. Everyone else is watching their ZiG-denominated wealth erode in real terms while the headline numbers celebrate stability.
What the Split Screen Actually Means
Read these three events together and the picture becomes precise.
Zimbabwe is running two economies. One is denominated in dollars, powered by mining and commodity exports, connected to international capital flows, and performing exceptionally well by any emerging-market standard. Gold at 5,100 dollars an ounce. Platinum surging. Lithium processing plants under construction. The VFEX up 34 percent. The IMF projecting 5 percent growth. This economy is real. The people inside it are getting wealthier.
The other economy is denominated in ZiG, powered by domestic consumption, dependent on credit availability and consumer purchasing power, and suffocating under a 35 percent interest rate that was designed to protect the currency, not to grow the economy. OK Zimbabwe is the latest casualty. It will not be the last.
The Econet delisting sits at the border between these two economies. Masiyiwa is moving his company from the ZiG economy to the dollar economy, from the ZSE to a private structure with international orientation. He is not leaving Zimbabwe. He is leaving the side of the economy that the current monetary framework is slowly strangling.
The policy question that emerges from this split screen is whether the RBZ and Treasury can find a way to ease the pressure on the domestic economy without destabilising the currency that the dollar economy depends on. Eddie Cross argues the 35 percent rate must come down. The RBZ argues stability must be maintained. Both are right about different halves of the same country.
The investment question is simpler. The dollar economy is where returns are being generated. Mining equities, VFEX-listed stocks, commodity-linked assets, and any business with a hard-currency revenue stream will continue to outperform. ZiG-denominated consumer businesses will continue to struggle until either the interest rate drops or consumer incomes catch up to the headline growth that the mining sector is driving.
The human question is harder. An economy that enriches its miners and starves its retailers, that celebrates 3.8 percent inflation while OK Zimbabwe enters corporate rescue, that produces a 34 percent VFEX return while families choose between bread and bus fare, is an economy that must eventually reconcile its two halves. The question is whether that reconciliation comes through policy adjustment or through the kind of social pressure that no stock exchange can absorb.
Masiyiwa saw the split screen and chose a side. The market rewarded him for it. The people who shopped at OK Zimbabwe did not get to choose. The distance between those two experiences is the distance between Zimbabwe’s best economic metrics and its most honest ones.
Until Next Time, Head Bowed.
U